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Many scholars have noted the rise of labor militancy in contemporary China. This rise is 
often linked to the growing discontent of an expanding working class facing harsh market 
conditions. We might expect workers in state-owned enterprises, which have suffered state-
cut backs and harsh privatization, to be among the most militant. This study reveals, 
however, that workers at one of such state-owned enterprises are far from militant. I argue 
that the urgency of survival and the denial of alternative work opportunities have effectively 
prevented any form of collective resistance on the part of these workers. Instead, their 
resistance only manifests in forms of so-called everyday resistance. Furthermore, these forms 
of resistance work as a double-edged weapon with harmful consequences for both the regime 










Labor unrest, whether in the form of collective confrontations or law suits, has 
increased dramatically in contemporary China. Recent statistics from the Supreme People’s 
Court showed that the number of participants in industrial disputes in China has grown 
from around 10,000 in 1993 to 317,000 in 2009, with the total number of participants 
increasing from 0.7 million to over 5.4 million (China News 11 March 2010). This means 
that in 2009, approximately one fourth of China’s 21.7 million industrial workers (China 
Statistic Yearbook 2009) were involved in some form of labor dispute. Similarly, according to 
one scholar’s estimation (Yu 2010), in that same year, there were around 90,000 mass 
incidents throughout China, one third of which were labor-related. This puts the number of 
strikes and collective worker protests in 2009 at around 30,000.  
Such widespread labor militancy has caught the attention of labor studies scholars 
both within and outside of China, and numerous accounts of these labor movements have 
been recorded and analyzed accordingly (Cai 2002; Pei 2003; Lee 2007; Ngai, Chan and 
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Chan 2009). Beverly J. Silver and Lu Zhang (2009), in a recently published article, claim 
that, along with the mass movement of capital into China and the deepening 
commodification of labor, a consolidated Chinese working class has finally been created that 
responds to economic transformations through collective organization and even 
revolutionary actions. Their argument speaks to the turbulent labor formation process and 
labor movement development in contemporary China, where workers are having to adjust 
to, negotiate with, and fight against the oppressive labor regimes that have accompanied 
China’s great transformation from an autarkic socialist country to a major player in the 
framework of neoliberal global capitalism.  
 Amidst all this turbulence and excitement, however, there is another form of 
resistance that has been constantly and, to a certain degree, understandably dismissed – the 
so-called ‘everyday resistance’ famously identified and examined by James Scott (1987). This 
kind of long-lasting resistance, with its more spontaneous, individualized, subdued, and 
relatively safer manifestations, is always adopted by subordinated social groups in human 
history (Hobsbawm 1965; Bloch 1970; Gaventa 1980; Oi 1991; Friedman, Pickowicz, 
Selden and Johnson 1991). This study aims to re-explore and re-evaluate this easily ignored, 
but prevalent form of resistance as it is enacted by Chinese workers, either as a complement 
to open collective resistance or as the main or sole form of resistance to the massive 
transformations of China’s entry into globalized capitalism. It investigates how workers have 
responded to the sharp deterioration in their living and working environment caused by 
neoliberal market reform, from the middle of the 1990s to the present, in one particular 
state-owned enterprise (SOE), Nanfang Steel (NS). I argue that when confronting the same 
general capital movement and labor commodification and accordingly degradation, in 
reality, workers have to face concrete conditions and hence generate various forms of 
responses and resistances. As James Scott (1987: xv) reminds us at the very beginning of his 
brilliant study of Malay peasants’ resistance against agricultural capitalization, ‘most 
subordinate classes throughout most of history have rarely been afforded the luxury of open, 
organized, political activity’ since ‘such activity was dangerous, if not suicidal.’ In the case I 
examine, the urgency of survival and the denial of alternative work opportunities have 
effectively prevented any form of collective resistance on the part of NS workers. Though 
there is great resentment and even hatred toward the management in their minds, the 
workers at NS are far from militant.  Rather, they are generally compliant – at least 
ostensibly. Their resistance manifests in much more subdued, spontaneous, and 
individualized ways: back-stage rumors and curses, apathy, foot-dragging, feigned ignorance, 
pilferage, and so on – the typical ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1987). 
Such forms of resistance can easily be denigrated as trivial and unimportant and thus 
ignored, and the predominant focus on collective labor movements within Chinese labor 
studies reveals precisely this tendency. Even among the very few studies that acknowledge 
and investigate ‘everyday resistance’ among Chinese workers, scholars tend to imply the 
phenomenon is negligible and ineffective, rather than significant. For example, Ching Kwan 
Lee (1998), in her article illustrating SOE workers’ responses toward market reform in the 
late 1990s, chooses the term ‘collective inaction’ instead of ‘everyday resistance’ to describe 
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workers’ individualized resistance toward the regime. The former term implies that such 
resistance is negligible as long as workers remain collectively inactive. The term was also 
adopted later by Aiyu Liu (2005) and applied to her study of workers’ responses toward 
reform in five SOEs from four different cities (Shanghai, Shengyang, Nanning, and Taiyuan) 
in the middle of the 2000s. Similarly, Liu noted the general existence of collective inaction 
among workers in these enterprises, but she went even further to claim that it was precisely 
this inaction on the part of workers that has guaranteed and will continue to guarantee the 
smooth execution of further SOE reform in China. Both accounts, while acknowledging the 
existence of everyday forms of resistance among workers, regard such resistance as 
insignificant, inconsequential, and, hence, ignorable. This view, which is unfortunately 
shared by many others, risks missing something essential. It is akin to confining one’s 
investigation only to the violent eruptions of a volcano, while totally disregarding the 
subdued magma flow beneath the surface – when it is, in fact, this action beneath the surface 
that determines whether, when, why, where, and how the volcano will erupt. Scott, in his 
work, has hence rebutted such denigration of everyday resistance by pointing out that while 
such actions may not make headlines, they can nibble away at the legitimacy of the system in 
the long run, and ‘make an utter shambles of the policies dreamed up by their would-be 
superiors in the capital’ (Scott 1987: xvii). To prove this argument, he elaborates in great 
detail and depth how the everyday resistance adopted by Malaysian peasants against their 
oppressors has at least delayed the complete transition to capitalist relations of production in 
the countryside.  
My research of NS has similar, but distinct findings. At NS, workers’ everyday 
resistance has two meaningful consequences. On the one hand, it has delegitimized the 
controlling power of the management, provoked other forms of collective inaction among 
the management (e.g., hesitant and apathetic labor control on the shop floor), damaged the 
production process, and hence ridiculed the whole reforming agenda, causing its failure. On 
the other hand – and this is the aspect not explored by Scott – the NS workers’ everyday 
resistance has actually gone against their previously shared work ethic, distanced them from 
their work, shattered their sense of honor and pride, and strengthened their feelings of 
inadequacy and powerlessness. In short, the everyday resistance adopted by NS workers has 
worked as a double-edged weapon with harmful consequences for both the regime and its 
workers.  
In this article, I begin by providing a brief introduction of my case enterprise, 
Nanfang Steel, especially its particular neoliberal reforming process, and the social 
consequences that have followed. I then discuss NS workers’ responses to their deteriorating 
working and living environments, specifically, their particular forms of daily resistance. I go 
beyond simply noting these forms of resistance, however, and examine their consequences 
also, showing how they have paradoxically shaped the fate of both the regime and its 
workers. In conclusion, I then highlight the constraining power of the system against 




Surviving Marketization: Reform and Its Consequences in NS Steel 
Located in the mountainous area within the province of Sichuang, Nanfang Steel, an 
essential steel production site in southeast China, is an immense state-owned enterprise that 
was developed as one of thousands of ‘third-front enterprises’ during the Third Front 
Construction (TFC) era in the 1960s. The objective of Third Front Construction was to 
create an entire industrial system within the Chinese hinterland – the naturally remote and 
strategically secure region – as a direct response of socialist China to military threats, 
primarily from two imperialist powers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., during the Cold War 
(Chen 1997; Ma 1998). The Front was meant to serve as a large-scale industrial network, 
linking the entire interior area through major transport and industrial facilities. During its 
heyday of the late 1980s and early 1990s, NS was one of the biggest taxpayers in Sichuan 
province and employed around 30,000 workers. Even today, after more than half of its 
workers have been laid off or have simply retired, it is still the largest and most significant 
employer in the area, with around ten thousand workers.  
In the mid-1990s, a variety of market-oriented means (bankruptcy, merger, 
privatization, downsizing for efficiency, burden alleviation, large-scale lay-offs, and so on) 
were encouraged by the central state to reform the so-called ‘inefficient’ SOEs, including NS. 
Instead of revitalizing them, however, these programs have brought large-scale bankruptcy 
and privatization of small and middle-sized SOEs nationwide, and incurred great anger 
among newly-unemployed/laid-off workers in many parts of the country (Blecher 2002; Cai 
2006; Chen 2006; Lee 2000, 2002, 2007; Gallagher 2005). Responding to the increasing 
unrest and grievances, the central government has slowed down bankruptcies and huge 
layoffs since 2002 in the remaining large SOEs, largely for the sake of stability and legitimacy. 
Among these remaining large SOEs, some ‘have managed to prosper throughout China’s 
economic boom’ (Chan and Unger 2009: 2). These include 150 or so key enterprises owned 
and controlled by the central state (Dyer and McGregor 2008) and a few others that have 
‘adjust[ed] successfully to the introduction of a market economy’ (Chan and Unger 2009:1). 
Still others have actually failed the reform but have been saved from collapse for the political 
consideration of stability. For them, final bankruptcy has been staved off, but instead, most 
of them have simply been dragged into a slow and painful dying process (Huang 2006).  
NS is one of these ailing, yet surviving SOEs. In NS, turbulent marketization 
combined with the preservation of the factory has produced dramatic social changes with 
unsettled consequences. First, there is the formation of a despotic factory regime on the 
shop-floor. In NS, efforts to set-up a modernized enterprise by building up an effective 
‘incentive mechanism’ and setting up ‘scientific management’ have not saved the enterprise 
from chronic losses. Rather, the result has been the creation of a coercive, yet apathetic 
regime in which piece-rates and strict economic penalties serve as the two primary methods 
of labor control. Together, these measures have produced a strong sense of labor alienation 
among workers in NS.1  
Secondly, wage reform and welfare reform, both adopted since the mid-1990s, have 
further impoverished NS workers and led to the disintegration of the working-class 
community.  Even though the average wage for NS workers has increased from around 1000 
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Yuan in 1980 to 10,000 Yuan in 2009, that number is still far below the average wage in 
Sichuan Province – 23,191 Yuan (People’s Daily: Sichuan 15 May 2010), and the increase is 
completely overmatched by the skyrocketing increase in living expenses. Furthermore, the 
wage gap between managers and workers within NS has increased tremendously. The average 
wage of managers is ten to thirty times that of workers, and if we take into account the so-
called ‘under-the-table’ money that is available to members of management, the gap is likely 
even wider.  
At the same time, along with widening wage disparities, the so-called welfare reform 
– which refers collectively to house reform, education reform, and medical reform – has 
smashed the safety net previously provided by the SOE and contributed greatly to the 
disintegration of the NS community, a previously fully functioning, consolidated, and 
prosperous mini-kingdom supported by the enterprise. Now, instead, a segregated working-
class slum has emerged within the old NS community.2 Rather than relying on enterprise-
subsidized dwellings, education, and health care, people now have to purchase these goods 
and services from the market, where costs vary dramatically. With their meager income, 
workers soon find out that the only options available to them are the lowest-grade ones. 
These days, they can only afford to obtain medical services from the previously enterprise-
sponsored, but now stripped-down hospital with poor medical equipment and services due 
to investment shortage; they buy or rent the destitute, but relatively cheaper apartments 
built up by the enterprise mostly in the 1980s, in the old working class community; and 
they are forced to send their kids to the local, low-quality public schools within the 
neighborhood in which they are now living. Yaping, one female worker in her 30s, took the 
example of education and complained to me: 
 
‘Everything now is going back to how it was before the liberation [1949]. Before, 
kids from the poor family couldn’t afford to go to school. Now, poor kids can’t 
afford to go to school again. All the sacrifices and efforts our martyrs made for this 
country are betrayed’. 
 
When Yaping complained about the cost of education, she did not mean that working-class 
children cannot go to school at all; rather, she was lamenting that they can only afford to go 
to the low-quality, local public schools, thus risking their future because their parents can’t 
afford the dwellings in the nearby city, where public schools, health care, and other basic 
infrastructures are far better – and where, not incidentally, all the NS managers choose to 
live.  
Yaping’s point applies to other aspects of life. It is not that ordinary NS workers 
cannot afford dwellings, it is that they can only afford shoddy ones; it is not that they cannot 
afford apparel or food, it is that they can only afford the cheapest ones; and so on. The 
complaint is in response to a paradoxical situation, in which living standards have generally 
improved, but they have also become marked by stunning inequalities – something that is 
still new to most workers who either experienced or remember a past era when working-class 
kids and managers’ kids went to the same schools, and workers and managers lived in the 
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same buildings or neighborhoods, went to the same hospital and stores, and celebrated 
holidays in the same hall. In other words, it is not so much the absolute poverty – the 
starvation, malnutrition, or homelessness per se – that distresses NS workers, but the strong 
sense of being marginalized and excluded from other, more promising, decent, and 
prosperous options that are saved for richer people, including NS managers.  
In sum, all of these changes – the shift to a despotic factory regime, the increase in 
workers’ relative poverty, and the disintegration of any shared sense of community – have 
marginalized NS workers to a great extent. The turbulent neoliberal reform and the 
following preservation of NS from bankruptcy have exempted workers from abject poverty, 
but forced them into an undignified, degraded, and subordinate way of living. This 
degradation is keenly and painfully sensed by many common workers, as pointed out by 
Weijie, a female worker in her late 40s:  
 
‘Yes, we do have more things to buy in the market and the consumer goods are much 
richer than before. So what? We could eat better? Wear better? Is that all? I think 
now we are living like animals’! 
 
Stating that workers are ‘living like animals’ is a desperate cry from common workers for the 
dignity and respect that they have lost under the current regime, a loss so fundamental that it 
cannot be compensated by the abundance of material commodities offered by the emerging 
consumerist society. As I observed in the field, dismay and desperation were actually 
everywhere. But, have all these conditions thus fostered a militant working class that is 
responding to these adverse social changes with collective and open confrontations? I explore 
this question in the next section. 
 
 
Fight Silently: Everyday Resistance in NS 
In her global narrative of labor unrest in the past 130 years, Beverly Silver (2003) 
identifies two types of labor unrest: Marx-type and Polanyi-type. Marx-type unrest mainly 
refers to workers’ struggles against capitalist exploitation in production. Polanyi-type unrest, 
by contrast, refers to the ‘backlash’ resistance from those workers who had benefited but are 
recently ‘unmade’ from established social compacts. Both types are absent from the 
currently-employed workers in NS.3 In fact, despite being faced with continuously 
degenerating social status and living and working environments since the 1990s, NS workers 
have never organized any forms of collective resistance, not even once. Instead, they are, at 
least ostensibly, acquiescent and resigned. However, it would be cursory to conclude that 
these workers are just passive victims who tamely submit to the oppressive external 
power/order and fatefully accept an uncontrollable destiny. Indeed, my ethnographic 
research reveals that many workers have actually harbored great resentment and even hatred, 
mostly against the management, and tactically expressed these feelings in more surreptitious, 
spontaneous, and individualized ways. That is to say, NS workers have employed their 
‘weapons of the weak’ in ways quite similar to those of the Malaysian peasants in Scott’s 
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study – ways that include ostensible conformity, backstage rumors and curses, and shop-floor 




On the shop floor, according to my observation, workers rarely confront their direct 
managers, the section chiefs. Usually, workers are obedient, with a small number of them 
being apparently deferential or even adulatory, and most others passively compliant. One day 
when Aqiu, one electrician in his late 30s took me with him to his shift, we met his section 
chief at the entrance of the workshop. The section chief didn’t say a word about my presence 
there, but scolded Aqiu very sternly for not wearing a safety hat. Aqiu just stood there and 
listened with his head hanging down. Later, when I asked him whether he felt humiliated at 
that moment, he replied: 
 
‘Not really. It was good that he didn’t deduct my money…. You have to think in this 
way: as long as you are eating from their bowl, you have to obey their rule. Only if I 
don’t want this job, I can yell back at you when I feel unhappy…’. 
 
In this case, Aqiu suppressed his possible anger because of anxiety about possibly losing his 
job, but he also had to convince himself that this was, indeed, part of the game one has to 
play in order to get over the feeling of inadequacy and humiliation. He had to admit that he 
was inferior by nature to his manager since it was he, Aqiu, who ‘had to eat from their bowl’ 
as if he was a beggar, instead of a worker who was honorably exchanging his labor power for 
a deserved wage.  
Very similar submissive responses can be found under different situations, for 
example, when workers are subjected to work overload, asked to work longer, or even to 
work under perilous conditions; most workers rarely or only slightly resist. Dagang, another 
electrician in his early 40s, related a typical incident that happened at his work: 
 
‘In the past, two electricians were always required to do the job together, with one 
working and another one overseeing to assure the safety. Now with the downsizing of 
workers, we have to work by ourselves, which increases the risk of accidents to a great 
extent. One time, I was on my duty by myself when the heavy rain damaged the 
circuits and the master switch was tripped. The production had to stop. So the 
manager asked me to turn on the switch. I told the manager that since the switch 
tripped because of the short circuit, it was very dangerous to forcefully turn it on. He 
said that he couldn’t stop the production and I had to go. Then I asked for an 
assistant to help me. The switch was near the top roof. Even if I climbed into the 
overhead traveling crane, I couldn’t reach it. From there, I still had to climb up a 
ladder to reach the switch. I needed another worker to at least hold up the ladder for 
me. Later he found out another electrician from other sector for me. I told that 
electrician, “We should not take the risk to do that, but the manager is forcing us. 
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What should we do”? He replied, “What should we do? Maybe bet our lives for good 
luck”. (Laugh) At last, we decided to turn off all the switches in the workshop first, 
then turn on the master switch, then turn on the other small switches one by one. 
Luckily, we adopted this strategy, since when we turned on the last small switch, it 
exploded. It was a small one, so we were fine; if we had turned on the master switch 
first without turning off all other switches as the manager demanded, it would 
definitely have exploded and most probably we would have died. There are so many 
accidents these years, here or there. So I have to be very careful’. 
 
Since the incomes of workshop managers are now directly related to output, production is 
always prioritized over safety. In the instance described by Dagang, as in many other cases, 
production output outweighed workers’ safety without any hesitation on the manager’s part. 
The industrial accident rates have rocketed in NS recently, since the factory is now reluctant 
to spend money on the safety measures it maintained before, and managers, under the 
pressure of production quota, are more likely to neglect such measures. When confronting 
the coercive dictates from managers, even in matters with life-or-death consequences, most 
workers simply ‘bet their lives for good luck’ and obey. ‘You have to do your job, nothing 
there to be argued’ is just the cruel reality forced upon NS workers and they clearly realize it.  
The reasons behind such compliance and resignation are quite simple: workers’ fear 
of losing their jobs and their clear recognition of their disposability. Zhangyong, a steel 
worker in his early 30s, explained it in his own words: 
 
‘Who need our workers? Now there are so many peasant workers rushing into the 
cities. There is nobody to do the job? Just go to the labor market and yell, “I have 
some jobs here, want to come?” People will surely rush to you like a swarm of bees. 
So our workers are just shit’. 
 
The fear of being fired comes from workers’ memory of the large-scale lay-off in the late 
1990s, when around one half of them were laid off in different ways. Even though such huge 
lay-offs have ceased since 2002 and the process of firing now has to comply with the labor 
contract signed between the enterprise and workers and thus can’t be too arbitrary, the fear 
of losing their jobs still haunts the minds of currently-employed workers. At the end of 2008, 
when the so-called global financial crisis brought another economic downturn nationwide, as 
well as in NS where losses that year reached 39.3 million Yuan (NS Annual Report 2008), 
rumors quickly spread among workers in NS that all workers would be laid-off, and then 
only a very small proportion of them would be chosen and re-employed. Almost everybody 
expressed the same pessimistic concern that ‘we are in the same situation as we were in the 
1997 (when the large-scale laid-off happened).’ The purported huge lay-off has yet to happen, 
but the threat is always looming. 
On the other hand, the hope of finding a suitable job outside NS is dim. When 
competing with the large labor reserve army that includes migrant workers from the destitute 
countryside, laid-off workers from bankrupted SOEs, and freshly-graduated students from 
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colleges, these currently-employed workers, many of whom possess only manual or limited 
skills and are middle-aged, are at a severe disadvantage. In the 1990s, when the market 
reform of NS was in its most turbulent phase – many workshops in NS were closed; many 
workers were either laid-off or sent on long, unpaid vacation due to the closure of 
workshops; and the enterprise kept on delaying its paydays – many workers I interviewed 
took advantage of this period to try their luck in the outside world. Some of them went to 
work in the township and village enterprises (TVEs), others in the private enterprises, but all 
as manual workers. Most of them ended their ‘outside’ journey by returning to NS when the 
radical marketization phase ended and some production returned to normal in the early 
2000s. Aqiu, the electrician in his 30s, explained his return to NS after working in a private 
factory for a few months in the following manner: 
 
‘The living expenses were much higher outside. After all these expenses including 
rents and transportation fees, I had little left to send back to my family. It was not 
worth it to leave my wife and my kid behind with so little contributions I could 
make to them’. 
 
Qin Jie, one female worker in her early 40s, worked for a private employer as a bookkeeper 
before she came back to NS: 
 
‘I believed that my boss must be a criminal before. He was so rude and uncivilized. 
But he had a very strong background and the official network. You didn’t know how 
bad he treated his workers, as if they were animals! He didn’t treat them like person. 
So one day after a big fight with him, I quitted’. 
  
Another worker, Yong, returned to NS after he was employed as a steelmaker in a private 
factory for three months because his retired parents in NS insisted he do so: ‘They threatened 
to cut off the relationship with me.’ Later, his mother explained to me: 
 
‘He is just a steelmaker, without higher education or advanced skills. Now he has 
strength, but soon the strength will go. Besides, who knows how long these private 
little factories could survive? Numerous have already been bankrupted. No matter 
how bad NS is now, at least relatively it is more secure’. 
 
His mother’s concern is not unjustified. Yong himself admitted to me that one of his friends 
who worked in a private steel factory was fired after breaking one of his arms there. The 
unregulated outside labor market has not brought the ‘better life’ promised by the ‘free 
market’; instead, it has further strengthened the subjugation of workers, locked them into the 
most disadvantaged positions within the labor market, and thus excluded them from it to a 
certain extent.  
In this sense, the preservation of NS has indeed saved NS workers from becoming 
members of the millions upon millions of dislocated labors swarming in the export-oriented 
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globalized sweatshops in the South or simply becoming unemployed. But on the other hand, 
it has also created a permanent possible threat to workers, constantly reminding them of the 
fragility of their jobs and how easily and sometimes arbitrarily they could be taken away. 
Based on this understanding, we can see that workers’ compliance is far from their 
‘backwardness’ or ‘cowardice,’ but actually quite self-protective and pragmatic: it is against 
the threat of job deprivation. As Scott (1987: 279) puts it, ‘his effort and his achievement, in 
one sense, have been to swallow his anger lest it endanger his livelihood.’ But it can be a very 
hard thing to swallow for many workers and, indeed, even when it is swallowed, it is always 
accompanied with humiliation, resentment, and even hatred. 
 
 
RESENTMENT, RUMORS AND CURSES 
Almost every worker I interviewed harbors strong resentment toward the factory’s 
management, referring to this specific group of people as ‘Dang Guan De’ (people who hold 
power). They use expressions like ‘those people are not human’ or ‘they are merely ghosts’ to 
express their indignation and resentments. During the interview with Dayong, a steel worker 
in his early 30s, he spent one third of his time cursing the managers in NS. When he talked 
about a case of theft that happened in his workshop two years ago, he angrily attributed the 
theft to the managers in the workshop: 
 
‘You know, what had been stolen were tons of Ni Plates. That was a lot. How could 
the common workers steal them out? … We all believe that those ‘dang guan de’ did 
some tricks on the accounting books. When the Ni plates were claimed being 
ordered from outside and then stolen, our workshop was on temporary shutdown. So 
who knows? … When the cops talked to us, we all told them to investigate the case 
thoroughly, find out the thief (thieves), and shoot him (them) to death’. 
 
He emphasized the point that these managers should be shot to death at least three times 
during the interview. Dayong is not a particularly tough or militant worker in any sense. He 
is a hard-worker in other people’s eyes and used to be a team leader. But Dayong is not 
alone; in fact, it seems that resentment is actually hidden in every worker’s heart. During my 
time in NS, whenever workers gathered together, management corruption was always one of 
the most popular topics: which one embezzled a huge amount of money (the amount of 
which was always ridiculously high, and most likely, exaggerated); which one just bought 
another apartment in the city or a luxurious car; which one sent his/her kid to an expensive 
private boarding school; and so on. And the workers usually ended all these stories with 
curses, such as ‘these fuck bloodsuckers will die as dogs’ or ‘they should be shot to death.’  
Very similar to the observations made by Eszter Bartha (2005) of the Hungarian state 
workers who blamed everything except the system for their negative experiences after 
transformation, in NS, workers’ indignation was directed only to managers as a group, who 
were condemned as ‘betrayers of the enterprise’ and ‘greedy bloodsuckers of workers’ labor.’ 
Many workers declared that NS’s problems had nothing to do with the command economy 
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or market economy, but were due entirely to the corruption of managers. Frances Fox Piven 
and Richard A. Cloward (1977: 20) attribute such interpretations to workers’ inability to 
abstract their immediate concrete experiences to the macro-level transformation, since 
‘workers experience the factory, the speeding rhythm of the assembly line, the foremen, the 
spies, the guards, the owner, and the pay check. They do not experience monopoly 
capitalism.’ Scott (1987: 43), by quoting Piven and Cloward, reaches a similar conclusion 
about the Malay peasants: since they did not experience ‘the cash nexus or the capitalist 
pyramid of finance,’ ‘the poorer strata of Sedaka see the causes of their present distress as 
primarily personal (that is, a result of human agency), local and largely confined to the Malay 
community’ (1987:181). However, this explanation does not totally apply here. 
In NS, workers are actually experiencing both the outside macro change and the 
inner micro change at the same time, but in quite contradictory ways. They learn from the 
mass media and witness for themselves the rapidly prospering country with dazzling 
skyscrapers, grand projects, luxurious commodities, and newly-affluent people with 
seemingly unlimited money. But simultaneously, they watch themselves sinking into 
desperation and poverty, and their community sliding into incessant decline. In other words, 
they are experiencing the transformation in a process of ‘abjection,’ as defined by James 
Ferguson (1999: 236) as ‘a process of being thrown aside, expelled, or discarded’ from the 
track of development, progress, and modernity that China now claims. Such highly 
contrasting and contradictory experiences bewilder and frustrate many workers as Xiaozhang, 
one worker in his middle 30s complained to me:  
 
‘No matter how this enterprise or this country changes, we workers work as before, 
but now with so little pay…. People like us couldn’t understand the stuff about the 
reform, but we could feel the pain in the grassroots enterprise’. 
  
Even though they might sense the changing attitude of the state toward the working class4, 
workers cannot confidently blame the state or the system since it is seemingly leading the 
country out of the status of a poor and underdeveloped third-world country previously 
suppressed by the West and granting ‘nationalist pride’ to the Chinese people as members of 
an emerging superpower in the world. As a result, they focus all their ire on management 
(and sometimes themselves, as I will analyze later) for their marginalization and abjection, 
and direct their resentment and hatred there. 
 
 
EVERYDAY RESISTANCE ON THE SHOP FLOOR 
Besides the backstage curses and rumors against the management, workers also 
strategically channeled their resentment and grievances in various negative ways on the shop 
floor. While absenteeism, tardiness, and resistance to discipline have been partially 
suppressed by strict financial penalties in recent years, foot-dragging and indifference have 
become the most prevalent forms of daily resistance. Almost all the workers I interviewed 
described their work as ‘muddling around in the workplace.’ Many workers explained to me 
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‘I go to work every day. Anyway that is how you get paid. But I only do the part that I have 
to do; never do more’ or ‘we work lazily and loosely, trying to avoid responsibilities.’  
When facing strict labor control at the production site, many workers adopted 
strategies of apathy and indifference. These strategies are characterized by workers’ seeming 
resignation, rooted in a strong sense of powerlessness, but accompanied by feelings of 
cynicism and suppressed resentment. Abin, a mechanic in his 30s, described it in this way: 
 
‘Before, when we were maintaining the equipments, we tried our best. If there were 
damages here, we would think that maybe there were damages there. So we made a 
total check and fixed everything; now if there are damages on this spot, the manager 
would say, “You have to fix this in five minutes, otherwise…”. When we bring apart 
the equipment, we might realize that the real reason for the damage on this spot is 
actually caused by problems from someplace else. But the manager doesn’t know this. 
He might just say, “Quick, replace this with a new one”. Our workers then say 
nothing too. We just do what he tells us and replace the bad hardware. After several 
hours, oh-oh, the equipment is out of order again. The manager doesn’t know what 
happened and becomes disturbed a lot. And our workers don’t say a word’. 
 
In this way, workers express their indifference and even disdain toward their managers. By 
standing aloof, watching the machine break down again and again and cynically enjoying 
their managers’ inability to do anything, workers exact revenge in their particular ways. 
When even grievances and sense of resentment have to be oppressed, workers turn to their 
own labor and skill as the weapon of last resort by withholding or hiding them from their 
oppressors, the managers. Such low-profile technique avoids workers’ outright defiance of 
their managers, but endows them a secret power to counterbalance, even if only to a small 
degree, the arbitrary and dominant power of the management.  
Meanwhile, the amount of pilferage has increased dramatically in recent years, 
according to the superintendent in the security department of NS. The workers I interviewed 
also admitted to me that stealing valuable alloys or any other materials from the enterprise 
was a very common behavior among workers. One worker estimated that about one third of 
workers were involved in various kinds of theft. Even though theft would be strictly 
penalized if discovered – the guilty worker would either be fired or jailed – many workers 
still choose to take the risk. To some extent, such deeds have been justified and tolerated by 
many workers as a desperate strategy for survival, as one worker angrily put it, ‘how much 
did we put in and how much did we get? How could we workers survive with several 
hundred Yuan per month in this society’? Besides poverty as a rationale, theft is definitely 
one form of resistance performed by workers against corrupt managers and bureaucrats, as 
illustrated by a common saying among workers: ‘people in the top steal big; people in the 
middle steal middle; workers in the bottom steal small’. The hidden inference here is that 
when compared with the large amount of money that corrupt managers embezzle from the 
factory, workers’ petty thefts amount to nothing. Many workers acknowledged that they 
would look the other way if they happened to catch somebody in the act of theft.  
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All these forms of everyday resistance adopted by NS workers under the camouflage 
of ostensible conformity – backstage rumors and curses, foot-dragging, suppressed apathy 
and pilferage – are actually the only means left for these workers to express their strong sense 
of deprivation and inadequacy, without seriously jeopardizing their and their family’s 
survival. Such actions are spontaneous, yet rational. And in ways both positive and negative, 




Two-edged Weapon: Paradoxical Consequences of Everyday Resistance in NS 
The forms of everyday resistance in NS outlined above have generated two different, 
yet co-existing sets of consequences. The first is the slowly corrosive or ‘nibbling’ effects 
against the regime as James Scott (1987) has described. The second, dismissed by Scott, is 
the detrimental effect of such resistance strategies for NS workers themselves. Combined, 




COLLECTIVE INACTION WITHIN THE MANAGEMENT AND THE IMPASSE 
OF PRODUCTION 
Needless to say, workers’ superficial compliance masking actual non-cooperation has 
greatly damaged the production process on the shop floor. Quite a few managers expressed 
to me their frustration and dismay toward workers’ non-cooperation and even hostility on 
the shop floor, and claimed it was very difficult to manage a smooth production process 
there. Importantly, instead of provoking more coercive labor control, such forms of silent 
resistance from workers have effectively delegitimized and undermined the controlling power 
of the management and induced a particular form of collective inaction among managers 
themselves. That is to say, they rarely adopted any substantial effort to counteract workers’ 
non-cooperation on the shop floor. Such collective inaction from the management is partly 
due to the devious and elusive characteristic of this particular kind of resistance, which makes 
identifying concrete enemies and evidence hard. But more importantly, the issue is simply 
the reluctance of the management to take action. And such reluctance, I will argue below, 
stems from the strong sense of illegitimacy that is currently prevalent among the 
management in NS.    
Among many other factors, such as the continuous losses of NS and the widening 
income gap between managers and workers, corruption is one of the most crucial factors that 
greatly delegitimize managers’ position vis-à-vis workers. Corruption exists in NS not merely 
as rumors. Laowu, one retired senior manager, admitted to me that even though it is hard to 
estimate how extensive state asset losses due to corruption are, corruption among the high-
level managers, through channels of circulation, contract systems and most recently the 
restructuring process, are rampant. Numerous private factories were established in the suburb 
of NS, owned by the family members of these corrupt top-level managers. These people have 
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become the ‘rich abbots’ in the ‘poor temple’ (穷庙富方丈). For the middle or lower-level 
managers, the most popular way to grasp money is to establish a nominal trading company 
‘under the table,’ by retaining for his/her own company some contracts from the factory and 
using materials, equipment, and workers from NS. All these tricks are clearly recognized by 
workers, though perhaps not in exact detail, and the involved managers also know that 
workers know. Even though corruption has become such a ‘popular’ and even 
‘institutionalized’ behavior in current Chinese society, it still brings about some uneasiness or 
qualms for managers, especially when they face workers. Occasionally, managers struggled 
hard to ‘naturalize’ their behaviors, as Amei, one lower-level manager, said to me: 
 
‘My colleagues are very nice. They all have their own ways to make money and 
nobody is jealous of you or blocks your way of making money. So, we have very good 
relationship with each other. A lot of my colleagues [all managers, author’s note] 
have bought cars. I am thinking of buying a car too. (Pauses for a while) You know, 
we are all cutting the ground of state-owned enterprises. (Very uncomfortable) Last 
year NS lost another 400 millions. Nobody knows what will happen next, so I have 
to take advantage of the present to make more money, right?  
 
[Question: Don’t you worry?] 
 
I don’t think that much. No use. Anyway there are so many people in NS. (Pauses 
for a while) Sometimes I am worried. You know, what could I do if NS really goes 
bankruptcy? (Shaking his head) Well, forget it. You know, I am thinking of buying a 
bigger car for my family…’. 
 
Amei’s annual wage is around 30 thousand Yuan, but he told me that his actual income 
could reach more than 100 thousand Yuan per year, two thirds of which came from the so-
called ‘special ways’. He meant to boast to me, to convey that, even though he still stayed in 
NS, a bad place in other people’s eyes, he was not a loser. Yet, during our conversation, he 
soon became unsettled about the topic, even though he chose to emphasize the ‘normality’ of 
such behaviors in the beginning by referring to his colleagues who were also making money 
in their own ‘special’ ways. ‘Cutting the ground of state-owned enterprise’ actually means 
stealing workers’ labor. Realizing that brings so much uneasiness to these managers that they 
don’t feel comfortable to confront workers when facing noncooperation and other silent 
resistances on the shop floor, unless their (the managers’) interests are seriously damaged. 
Instead, most of the time, they adopt the strategy of avoidance and apathy, merely relying on 
the numerous rules and economic penalties for labor control. Many workers I interviewed 
believed that their managers (the sector chief and above) were distanced from them, didn’t 
really care about the production, and only chased their own interests. Once, two workers, 
Dahua and Dali, described this kind of apathy for me vividly: 
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‘Dali: You can argue with them, but they just ignore you. It is different from before. 
Before, if you argued with them too impulsively, they would become angry and ask 
you to write a self-criticism. Now you can curse; they just pretend deaf.  
 
Dahua: They know that our workers are resentful, so when you blow off your 
repressed emotion, they would just avoid you. They could bear these, since they 
don’t have to work. 
 
Dali: It doesn’t relate to their interests. You can yell, cry, even bump your head 
against the wall---it doesn’t matter to them.  
 
Dahua: Ignore, just ignore. 
 
Dali: There are two layers, separated from each other. Your business has nothing to 
do with theirs. You take your money, and they take their money. 
 
Dahua: No matter how difficult the situation you are in, they will never help. They 
ignore you, since anyway your workers have to work to survive’. 
 
Dahua is a female worker in her late 40s. She had been forcefully retired several years ago. 
Her younger brother, Dali, is a team leader, as well as an excellent electrician. Both of them 
were depressed and angry during the whole interview. Unlike during the Maoist era when 
managers were encouraged or forced to ‘work side by side’ with workers, now, they are 
superior ‘bosses’ separated from workers, both physically and emotionally. 
Such reluctance and indifference is reflected among both managers and workers in 
the most popular expression, ‘who cares’. Aqiu, the electrician, illustrated this indifference: 
 
‘From our analysis, these managers also don’t really care. These equipments are not 
theirs. For our workers, it is the same. These equipments are not ours. It is not our 
factory, not mine, not yours. Sometimes we talk directly to the managers, “why did 
you manage that much? The factory is not mine, not yours, so how does it matter to 
you”? They know this. That’s why they don’t seriously discipline you; neither do 
they seriously make trouble to you’. 
  
On the surface, such indifference seems to originate from the problem of ownership, as many 
neoliberal economists insist, and as Aqiu suggests here. But, in fact, this performance of 
indifference masks all kinds of anxieties and insecurities among both workers and managers 
in NS. Public ownership only becomes a problem when it ceases to grant dignity and 
security to people. With both workers’ and managers’ identification with the enterprise 
destroyed by neoliberal market reform, ‘nobody cares’. Such double apathy, expressed by 
workers as one form of resistance, but also by managers as their response towards workers’ 
resistance, has almost crippled the whole production process, doomed NS into its chronic 
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losses, declared the complete failure of reform in NS, and finally, together with the failure of 
many other SOEs, made a mockery of the whole neoliberal SOE reforming agenda in China. 
 
 
WORKERS’ HIDDEN COSTS IN THEIR EVERYDAY RESISTANCES  
If all these forms of everyday resistance are eating away at the regime in a persistent 
yet imperceptible way, what kind of consequences have they had for workers – the 
performers of this resistance? On the most obvious level, everyday forms of resistance have 
offered some safer outlets for workers to express their frustrations and grievances; to a certain 
extent, they have curtailed managers’ controlling power in the shop floor; and presumably, 
they might even emit some subdued but desperate signals that have been sensed by the 
government, and hence contributed to measures that have helped to delay their final 
unemployment. Yet beyond all these, my ethnographic research has revealed another more 
hidden effect these particular forms of resistance have imposed on workers, that is, the 
psychologically detrimental effect on them. I argue that workers’ everyday resistance, 
expressed as it is through quite passive and negative ways, actually goes against the moralities 
generally held by most NS workers, distances them from their work, shatters their sense of 
honor and pride, and strengthens their feeling of inadequacy and powerlessness.  
Even though they are exposed to the emerging money worship and utilitarianism 
that has been wholeheartedly embraced by the middle and upper class in current Chinese 
capitalist society, many workers I know in NS still hold fast to some basic moral principles 
that they inherited from the older working-class generations, learnt from their school 
education, and possess as part of human nature. Honesty, righteousness, and industriousness 
still constitute the ethical framework through which workers can claim their dignity and 
pride. However, all the spontaneous forms of everyday resistance adopted by currently-
employed workers – foot-dragging, apathy, pilferage – actually run counter to these virtues.  
To illustrate this argument, consider again the description given earlier by Abin of 
workers apathetically watching both machines and managers falling into disorder and doing 
nothing. Although such inaction serves as a form of revenge against managers, there is also a 
paradox hidden in this strategy: in order to resist against the management, workers have to 
be antagonistic against their own jobs. That means, they have to restrain themselves from the 
fulfillment and pride they could have felt by their labor, for example, through successfully 
solving problems in this case, instead standing aloof and hostile, not only from their 
managers, but also from their own labor. A similar process of self-estrangement and 
antagonism can also be found in foot-dragging. It actually forces workers to doubt further 
the meaning of their work and sometimes, their own right to continued employment; as 
many workers said half-joking to me, ‘We really should be laid off’. When I asked Abin if he 
felt satisfied acting in such ways, he shook his head bitterly and said, ‘No, I feel sad. It is just 
ridiculous’. Abin entered NS in the early 1980s. He had been renowned for his exquisite skill 
factory-wide and hence awarded many times as a model worker in the 1980s and early 
1990s. Now, almost in his 50s, he asked me if there is any opportunity for him to migrate to 
the U.S. as a coolie.  
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A more acute paradox for workers comes from the pilferage that goes beyond self-
estrangement and actually challenges many workers’ moral baseline. Even though many of 
the workers I interviewed always defended other workers’ pilferage strongly and eagerly, 
almost everyone would add, ‘But I will not do those kind of thing’. It was always other 
people, not they who stole. Such efforts to distance themselves from such behavior might not 
necessarily come from their distrust toward me for fear of being reported since a strong sense 
of trust has already been established between us while I was in the field, but more likely from 
their deep shame toward it. It brings humiliation and disgrace to them. Even though they, 
themselves, might not be involved, as they claimed to me, they must know by instinct how 
easily and conveniently the image of the whole working class, like any subordinate social 
groups, could be stereotyped and stained by such deeds, even if performed only by some. In 
other words, these strategies of resistance have, in some ways, deprived workers of the pride 
and even legitimacy that could derive from clearly claiming their rights and proudly 
confronting the management.  
Such everyday strategies have also, combined with other dilemmas, brought pain – a 
feeling that does not just originate from poverty or deteriorating social status, but also from a 
sense of powerlessness and of having ‘no way out.’ As described by Richard Sennett and 
Jonathan Cobb (1972: 58), it is ‘the feeling of not getting anywhere despite ones’ efforts, the 
feeling of vulnerability in contrasting oneself to others at a higher social level, the buried 
sense of inadequacy that one resents oneself for feeling’. Often, when the pain became 
unbearable, workers choose to numb themselves in different ways. For example, 
gambling/playing Majiang have become the most popular entertainment among NS workers 
and managers, everywhere from teahouses, Majiang houses, parks, people’s homes, to the 
night-duty rooms of the workshop. Job insecurity, the depressing future of the factory, the 
anxieties of survival or making money, strong feelings of humiliation or illegitimacy, all of 
these have brought people to the gambling table. At least by cheering or contesting every 
small gain or loss, they can escape from their unhappy reality, even if only briefly. When I 
asked Xiaoxia, a steelworker in his early 30s, why he spent so much time on the Majiang 
table, he smiled shyly, ‘you have nothing to do here. Playing Majiang makes me happy; 
otherwise, I might go crazy’. Pausing for a while, he added uneasily, ‘I am hopeless’. Dali, the 
worker in his late 40s sharply pointed out, ‘Gambling is one way to numb us. Everybody 
plays Majiang because we don’t have any inner resources to support ourselves’.  
What we can see from the descriptions above is that all these forms of resistance 
enacted by currently employed workers in NS – curses, apathy, foot dragging, 
irresponsibility, pilferage, gambling, and so on – have not empowered them. Instead, they 
constantly contradict with and challenge the moral values they held strongly before, and 
hence further strengthen their sense of inadequacy. When I asked the workers I interviewed 
whether they would rebel if NS went into bankruptcy, almost all of them replied in a very 






The claim of ‘where capital goes, conflict follows’ (Silver and Zhang 2009) is 
certainly apt in highlighting the agency of subordinate groups – their willingness and 
capability to fight against the oppressive regime and try to control, at least partly, their own 
fate. But we have to be careful not to push this claim further to assume that the working 
class, by organizing unions, developing modes of collective representations and collective 
bargaining, and initiating demonstrations, strikes, or any other forms of collective resistances, 
will eventually develop an equally counter-balanced power against capital (private or state). 
This assumption, which is widely accepted by many labor study scholars from the branch of 
so-called ‘comparative studies of advanced capitalism’, follows the idea of labor as a ‘social 
partner’ within a triadic power relation, one which negotiates and bargains equally and 
constantly with the other two social partners: capitalists and the state (Eberwein, Tholen and 
Schuster 2002; Streeck 1984, 1989; Tilly and Tilly 1998). Such argument hence blurs the 
systematic and structurally unequal power relations between different social actors, while 
assuming the existence of a counterbalanced and hence democratic labor bargaining 
mechanism in advanced capitalist countries. However, such illusion has already been 
smashed by the coming of global capitalism, whereby unions and collective bargains 
suddenly became emaciated and common workers quickly lost what fragile fruit they had 
arduously achieved through hundreds of years of struggle and sacrifice. These harsh realities 
only throw into sharp relief the oppressive system itself and the vulnerability and limitations 
of the subordinated groups’ struggle.  
This article has provided another quite paradoxical and dismayed image of workers’ 
resistance in one state-owned enterprise in China, another crucial player in the current game 
of global capitalism. It has revealed how workers there have responded to the sweeping 
neoliberal reforming agenda and the emerging capitalist labor relationship. It then serves as a 
complementary work to the current Chinese labor movement studies that mainly focus on 
workers’ collective and militant resistance. Workers in China do resist. But as I have 
illustrated, to a large extent, they are able to do so only within a highly pressurized and 
constrained space. Unlike leftist, middle-class intellectuals, many of whom possess the 
privilege of contemplating the bigger world, choosing their political positions, and even 
putting their political proposals into meaningful actions, common workers, like many other 
subordinate classes, have to face a much rougher reality: they have to manage to survive and 
feed their family first, the right of which might be constantly threatened by the regime. In 
that sense, as revealed in this study, the forms of resistance taken by workers have to be 
circumvented, veiled, distorted, and sometimes even against their morality and nature. While 
these everyday resistances have certainly damaged the regime, they have also alienated, 
disempowered, and subordinated workers themselves.  
 Once in the field, when I was talking with several workers in their work cell, one 
worker leaned over to me and asked, ‘you come from the United States, so can you tell me, 
are the workers there happier than us?’ All the other workers looked at me and waited for the 
answer eagerly. I hesitated for a while, and then said, ‘I cannot tell on their behalf. But I 
guess maybe not’. All of them laughed and then the worker continued, ‘So can they afford 
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houses? Dare they go to the hospital when they are sick? Do they worry about the tuition fee 
for their kids’? When I told them that the working class in the United States has to face their 
own problems, they laughed bitterly again, yet sounded half-relieved, and one said, ‘so, 
workers everywhere are the same, small’.  
The only thing left uncertain is just how these ‘small’ resistance taken by these ‘small 
workers’, together with other more militant and collective ones, will eventually shape the 
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1.  The detailed illustration of the despotic factory regime in NS can be found in Li’s work 
(2012). 
 
2.  The detailed illustration of the disintegration and the segregation of the working class 
community can be found in Li’s work (2012). 
 
3.  The pensioners in Nangfang Steel did organize effective and militant collective resistance 
since the 1980s. See Li’s work (2012). 
 
4.  Once, Dayong, a steelworker in his early 30s, elaborated to me the changing images 
printed on the bills to illustrate how the state is abandoning workers: the images of steel 
workers and lathe workers previously printed on the Five-Yuan and Two-Yuan bills have 
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